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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment of the Trial Court,
(i.e., the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake County (the "Trial Court")), in the matter of Wasatch Crest Insurance
Company, in Liquidation, and Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company, In
Liquidation and Merwin U. Stewart, Liquidator v. LWP Claims Administrators
Corp., and LWP Claims Solutions, Inc., Case No. 030915527. This Court has
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(4)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Statement of the Issues:
I.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT HELD THAT, EVEN
THOUGH LWP WAS AN AFFILIATE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31A-27-322, LWP WAS NOT AN AFFILIATE IN CONTROL OF
INSURANCE BECAUSE MERE COMMON OWNERSHIP OR
OPERATION IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO PRESUME
CONTROL.
A.

Did the Trial Court Ignore the Evidence of Common Control/
Management?

B.

Did the Trial Court Err in Extending its Ruling to Both Mutual and
Insurance Where There Were Disputed Material Issues of Fact
Regarding the Extent of LWP's Control of Insurance and Mutual?
1.

Were There Material Issues of Fact in Dispute Regarding Mr.
Igoe's and Others Level and Duration of Control/
Management of Insurance Such That Summary Judgment
Should Have Been Denied to L WP?

2.

Were There Material Issues of Fact that Precluded Summary
Judgment on LWPys Control of Mutual?

II.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE WORDS
"DISTRIBUTION" AND "DIVIDEND" ARE SYNONYMOUS AND
THEREBY INCORRECTLY HELD THAT THE STATUTE DOES NOT
ALLOW RECOVERY OF PAYMENTS FOR SERVICES RENDERED?
A.

Did the Trial Court's Ruling that Distributions and Dividends are
Synonymous Offend the Objective and Policy of the Statute?

B.

Did the Trial Court Disregard the Legislative History of the
Statute that Indicates that the Statute is Applicable to All
Transactions, Not Just Dividends?

Standard of Review:
The Trial Court's "interpretation and application of a statute is a question of
law" and is reviewed for correctness, "affording no deference to the district court's
legal conclusion." Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913,914-15 (Utah 1998).
In the case of a summary judgment case, the Trial Court's application of law
to the undisputed facts is reviewed for correctness. See Uintah Basin Med Ctr. v.
Hardy, 2002 UT 92, ^ 7, 54 P.3d 1165, 1167 (Utah 2002) (stating that '"In
deciding whether the Trial Court correctly granted [summary] judgment as a matter
of law, we give no deference to the Trial Court's view of the law; we review it for
correctness.'") (citations omitted).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
1.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-27-322:

Recoupment from Affiliates
(1) If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation of an
insurer authorized to do business in this state is ordered under this chapter, the
receiver appointed under the order has a right to recover on behalf of the insurer
2

from any affiliate that controlled the insurer the amount of distributions, other than
stock dividends paid by the insurer on its capital stock, made at any time during the
five years preceding the petition for liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation.
This recovery is subject to the limitations of Subsections (2) through (6).
(2) No dividend is recoverable if the recipient shows that, when paid, the
distribution was lawful and reasonable, and that the insurer did not know and could
not reasonably have known that the distribution might adversely affect its
solvency.
(3) The maximum amount recoverable under this section is the amount
needed, in excess of all other available assets, to pay all claims under the
receivership, reduced for each recipient by any amount the recipient has already
paid to receivers under similar laws of other states.
(4) Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the insurer at the time
the distributions were paid is liable up to the amount of distributions he received.
Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the insurer at the time the
distributions were declared is liable up to the amount of distributions he would
have received if they had been paid immediately. If two or more persons are liable
regarding the same distributions, they are jointly and severally liable.
(5) If any person liable under Subsection (4) is insolvent, all affiliates that
controlled that person at the time the dividend was declared or paid are jointly and
severally liable for any resulting deficiency in the amount recovered from the
insolvent affiliate.
(6) This section does not enlarge the personal liability of a director under
existing law.
(7) An action or proceeding under this section may not be commenced
after the earlier of:
(a) two years after the appointment of a rehabilitator under Section
31A-27-303 or a liquidator under Section 31A-27-310; or
(b) the date the rehabilitation is terminated under Subsection 31A27-306(2) or the liquidation is terminated under Section 31A-27-339.

3

2.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31 A-l-301(5):

"Affiliate" means any person who controls, is controlled by, or is under
common control with, another person. A corporation is an affiliate of another
corporation, regardless of ownership, if substantially the same group of natural
persons manages the corporations.
3.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-l-301(27)(a)&(b):

(a) "Control," "Controlling," "controlled," or "under common control"
means the direct or indirect possession of the power to direct or cause the direction
of the management and policies of a person. This control may be:
(i)
by contract;
(ii) by common management;
(iii) through the ownership of voting securities; or
(iv) by a means other than those described in Subsections 27(a)(i)
through (iii).
(b) There is no presumption that an individual holding an official position
with another person controls that person solely by reason of the position.
4.

Addendum:
a) Memorandum in Support of Liquidator's Motion for Summary
Judgment (without exhibits).
b) Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and
Opposition to Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment (without
exhibits).
c) Liquidator's Memorandum in Opposition to LWP's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Reply Memorandum In Support of
Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment (without exhibits).
d) Reply Memorandum In Support of LWP's Motion for Summary
Judgment (without exhibits).
e) Affidavit of John Igoe (without exhibits).
f) Affidavit ofOrrin T.Colby, Jr.

4

g) Supplemental Affidavit of John A. Igoe.
h) June 21, 2005 Memorandum Decision.
i) October 31, 2005 Order Granting LWP's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
j) The legislative history UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-322.
k) Revised Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of Judge
Tyrone E. Medley dated May 22, 2003 in the lawsuit captioned
American Western Life Insurance Company in Liquidation, et al. v.
LelandA. Wolf, et al (Case No. 98090521).
1) The case of Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., 411 P.2d 150, 151 (Utah
1970).
m)The case of Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752
(UtahCt.App. 1988).
n) The case of In Re Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, 1 P.3d 1074 (Utah 2001).
o) The case of Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 2002
UT 32, If 18, 48 P.3d 888, 894 (Utah 2000).
p) The case of Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984).
q) The case of/« re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 560 F. Supp 1006,
1009 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
r) The case of Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 914-15 (Utah 1998)
s) T he case of Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2002 UT 92, f7, 54
P.3d 1165, 1167 (Utah 2002).
t) The case of Johnson-Tanner v. First Cash FinancialServ., Inc., 239
F. Supp. 2d 34, 39 (D.D.C. 2003).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below
Wasatch Crest Insurance Company ("Insurance"), in liquidation, and
Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company ("Mutual"), in liquidation, (Insurance
and Mutual are collectively referred to hereinafter as "Wasatch Crest"), by and
through Merwin Stewart,1 the Utah Insurance Commissioner, in his capacity as the
court-appointed liquidator (the "Liquidator"), brought suit against LWP Claims
Administrators Corp. and LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. (collectively, "LWP")
seeking recoupment of distributions arising out of certain affiliate transactions and
an accounting of monies paid by Insurance and Mutual to LWP for claims handling
services. (R. 841-50). The basis of the suit was that the Liquidator was statutorily
empowered pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-322 (hereinafter "Affiliate
Transaction Statute" or "Statute") to recover from any affiliate any distribution
made at any time during the five years preceding the petition for liquidation. (R.
848-49 ). The Liquidator presented evidence that LWP, Mutual and Insurance
were affiliates of one another, and therefore sought recoupment of any distribution
made to LWP from November 1999 (the date LWP became an affiliate), to July
31, 2003 (the date the Petition for Liquidation was filed). (R. 848-49).

1

Subsequent to the entry of the Liquidation Order dated July 23, 2003, Mr. Kent Michie
has succeeded Mr. Merwin Stewart as the Utah Insurance Commissioner and as
Liquidator of Insurance and Mutual.
6

After the present case w.'is reassigned to hulpy 1 Innson, (In I .iqnuhilnr
moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) LWP was an affiliate of Insurance
and Mutual because of the common/overlapping management, control and
common ownership; and (2) Insurance and Mutual were entitled to recoup any
y e a r s p recec jj n g

the Petition for Liquidation, (F

5

arguments as to Mutual only, acknowledging that there were issues of material fact
that precluded summary judgment for Mutual. (R. 2285).
In response to the Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment, LWP filed a
uigih. :ii anu opposition to
Liquid rr-r's Motio

>

• > -

*

LWP's Motion, it argued that the payments made by Insurance and Mutual to LWP
were not "distributions" subject to recoupment under the Affiliate Transaction
Statute. (R. 1945-52). LWP argued that there was no distinction between the
uui'iJs ' (lisinhiiiinn iiin) 'ill' nicinl in llic Matute because these words were
synonymous and interchanged 11 11'1 MM<H I Will11 iUn

)n\vd t!r»i tli<» i|HinHi<iM

of distribution and dividend did not include payments for services but only for
equity payments based on stock ownership, and as a result, the monies paid to
- * .... • consideration tor services rendered and not subject to recoupment.
conceding dial it and Insurance were

7

affiliates, argued that "affiliate" and "control" were different and there was no such
control. (R. 1952-54,2388-90).
Thereafter, the Trial Court heard oral argument and took the matter under
advisement. (R. 2436). On June 21, 2005, the Trial Court entered its
Memorandum Decision denying Wasatch Crest's Motion for Summary Judgment
and granting LWP's Motion. (R. 2435-41). In its Memorandum Decision, the
Trial Court held that "[t]here is no question that LWP was an affiliate of
[Insurance]". (R. 2437). The Trial Court, however, held that an affiliate was
distinct from an affiliate in control and there was no control by LWP, explaining,
"[t]he Court is not persuaded, however, that mere common ownership or operation,
at least to the extent set forth in this record, is a sufficient basis to presume
control." (R. 2437). The Trial Court weighed the time periods where there were
joint owners or operators of LWP and Insurance and found that insufficient to
prove control. (R. 2437).
Even though the Trial Court acknowledged its holding on control could end
the inquiry, the Trial Court went on to issue a ruling on the meaning of distribution
and dividend. (R. 2437-39). The Trial Court held that "the statute does not allow
recovery of payments for services rendered under Section 31A-27-322, inasmuch
as the legislature used, and presumably advisedly so, the term "dividend." A
dividend cannot be considered as a payment for services rendered

8

" (R. 2438).

In issuing this ruling, the Trial Court was persuaded bv 1 Wl r s nr|Mimnil lh.il III"
words "dividend" and "distribution" had the same meaning and encompassed only
payments based on stock ownership. (R. 2438).
:ereafter

^ ^'«

submitted its proposed order and the Liquidator on behalf of

iitlijnlHi (in I Vi I1" (i Nili'ii I iiiiiilini1 I VI I1 I lohon loi Summary

Judgment arguing that the Order wcnl

IM'MMKI

(li»i'''iijiM -"ii1 •* MiMnpuiuhi1.

Decision. (R 2460-73, 2510-18). On October 31, 2005, the Trial Court issued a
Minute Entry overruling Wasatch Crest's objections. (R. 2963-65).
jovemoc,
Notic•

,-."*-. the Liquidator on behalf of Wasatch Crest filed its
jL'iiu'in mi linilgi' 1 Janson entered on October 31,

2005.
Statement of Facts
LIQUIDATION

Insurance and Mutual were insurance companies (KniiuiKiJ in l he Nl;tlr yf
Utah, and placed into liquidation by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July ? •. 2003 (R. 2972).
CREATION OF LWP

Wasatch Crest Group, Inc. ("Group"), the parent corporation of In
purchased substantially all of the assets and business operations of LWP
Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. ("LWP Commercial") from John and
Fnui Igoi mi Nmunliri In I'l.i'i iK J..^S, 2l)/{) LWI' Commercial was in the
9

business of administering insurance claims on behalf of insurance companies, i.e.,
a third party administration. (R. 2258). In its capacity as a third-party
administrator, LWP specializes in the administration of workers' compensation
insurance and claims associated with ski industry workers. (R. 2259).
Concurrent with that purchase, Group created a new corporate entity, LWP
Claims Administrators Corp. ("LWP") which took possession and title to all of the
purchased assets. (R. 2258-9). Thereafter, the name of LWP was subsequently
changed to LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. (R. 2259). Though LWP Commercial and
LWP Claims Solutions are listed as separate defendants in this matter, they are the
same company and referred to as "LWP." (R. 2972). LWP is currently a
California corporation with offices in Sacramento, California and Salt Lake City,
Utah. (R. 2259). LWP was thereafter repurchased by John Igoe and Judy Adlam.
(R. 2254-5). The date of closing the sale was May 8, 2002. (R. 2254-5). LWP
and the Liquidator on behalf of Wasatch Crest dispute the effective date of the
closing. (R. 2254-5). The Liquidator maintains the closing agreement
demonstrates the closing was executed on May 8, 2002 using balances as of
January 1, 2002. (R. 2256). LWP concedes the closing was May 8, 2002 but
insists it was effective January 1, 2002. (R. 2256).

10

COMMON CONTROI ,,,IND MANAGEMENT OF 1JKUUIJ, L* VV t

v - J IJNSLKAMJK

By LWP's own admissions and as the Trial Court found, "[t]here is no
question that LWP was an affiliate of [Insurance],' ' (R 2 13 7).
W l i c i l i ni il i m 111 p u n I in. m1i »ni II 111 V" I" "I ' u i i i i l R I t h i ! m i N n \ i m b c i

In, |1M*M K I I

\ym

and his wife owned LWP Commercial (R 2258. 211)73) ' 1 1: lere is no dispi ite tl lat
shortly after the purchase of LWP Commercial, John Igoe became Acting
Chairman of the Board, President, Chief Operating Officer ("COO"), and Chief
Executive Officer ( \ i x:

of Group and Insurance. (R. 2254-5, 2973). It is also
•

Him.n .'I 'he liuanJ ,m<l " 'I < I,»' I \\ "

I

2255).

In addition to Mr. Igoe's overlapping management, during the same time,
Dennis Larson, who was involved in drafting and/or administering a services
agreement whereby LWP provided claims services to Mutual and Insurance, was
.: ^ nn management of
LWP,

'•

>

'

•,

2300).
The Trial Court held that LWP was an affiliate of Group and therefore an
affiliate of "Insurance from October 1998 until the sale of LWP to Igoe and Adlam

of Utah Insurance Department in (lump'1. Apiil lfn "'"(Hill hum III liliiit'1 w <m

11

exhibit. (R. 2284). It shows how Group, Insurance and others, were organized,
with Group as the parent and LWP and Insurance as a wholly owned subsidiary of
Group. (R. 2284).
Wasatch Crest Group, Inc.
a Utah Corporation

LWP Claims Administrators Corp.
a California Corporation

First Continental Life &
Accident Insurance Company
a Utah Insurance Company

Wasatch Crest Insurance Company
a Utah Insurance Company

AFFILIATE TRANSACTIONS AND RECOUPMENT OF DISTRIBUTIONS

On or about November 16, 1999, LWP Commercial, the selling entity
owned by John and Erica Igoe, and LWP (the subsidiary formed by Group to hold
the assets transferred by LWP Commercial), entered into an Administrative
Services Agreement. (R. 2260). During this time, Group was the parent of

LWP.

(R. 2973). The agreement provided that LWP was to be paid a fixed percentage
fee to administer all the claims throughout the entire duration of the claims. (R.
2260).
Effective January 1, 2001, Insurance and LWP entered into an
Administrative Agreement whereby LWP administered workers' compensation
claims for Insurance on a "life of claim basis". (R. 2262). Prior to 2001,

LWP was

providing workers' compensation claims handling services to Insurance pursuant
to an oral agreement. (R. 2261). LWP and the Liquidator, however, dispute some

12

of the specifics of each of the above agreements. (R. 2260, 2973-2974). While
there is a dispute as to the oral agreement, there is no dispute, however, that the
written service agreements were entered into. (R, 2260-61, 2975).
Thereafter, l

, resented to Mutual a proposed Administrative Agreement

lllijil > \ „ts t o hr r fftvl i\ t Jamiai ;\ I, /"(MM

(k

?.M)\)

Hit1 I r r n i s n l ihe agi r e n i n it

were identical to the Administrative Agreement entered into between I A11* .iinl
Insurance. (R. 2263). This agreement, however, was never executed; rather the
arrangement between Mutual and LWP continued under the terms of the verbal
agreenlent entered L U ,. .ovemoer 1999, whereby LWP v^.mid administer
^'nrkor^'

COII

|'

*

*).

* *: ' V

LWP asserts the verbal agreement was reached in Tune of?000 03

Though the parties differ on the exact amounts paid, it is admitted that LWP
received payments from Insurance and that such payments were for claims
handling and administrative services. (R..

he Liquidator proffered

m idemee 1 h;11 limn Mmnnhi m hi I1 W Ilimuj'Ji lull

III, ."(KM

INUM-UH

e paid

$6,144,402.68 to LWP for claims handling services, <)l \\ hich $4 * i ;

.s

in the form of check or wire transfers, while $1,188,816.58 was in the form of
offsets
lniKl|>-

i' 2265). The Liquidator also proffered evidence that during the same
umaipaiaj.

. ...

, . . ,. i- .*T claims handling services. (R
i| ||K" .mi mils til issue, lllim1

2266)
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specific dollar amount was irrelevant to the Trial Court's ultimate decision to grant
LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 2471).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Trial Court erred in its construction of section 31A-27-322 of the Utah
Code and the application of the Statute to the evidence presented for three reasons.
First, the Trial Court misinterpreted the meaning of "any affiliate that controlled
the insurer." The second is the Trial Court's misapplication of the facts to the
definition it gave to "affiliate that controlled the insurer." The third error was the
Trial Court's definition of "distribution" and "dividend" and the misapplication of
that interpretation to what is subject to recoupment. Rather than observe the plain
meaning of the Affiliate Transaction Statute, the Trial Court incorrectly found that
there was a distinction between "affiliate" and "control" and found that LWP was
not an affiliate that controlled Mutual or Insurance. The Trial Court further
incorrectly held that "distribution" and "dividend" were synonymous with one
another and the definition of distribution only applies to equity payments and not
payments for services rendered.
The applicable Statute at issue, UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-322, states in
pertinent part:
(1) If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or
conservation of an insurer authorized to do business in
this state is ordered under this chapter, the receiver
appointed under the order has a right to recover on behalf
14

••

oi liie insurer from any affiliate thai ^uiiioneu the insurer
the amount of distributions, other than stock dividends
. paid by the insurer on its capital stock, made at any time
during the five years preceding the petition for
liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation. This recovery
is subject to the limitations of Subsections (2) through
(6).
(2) No dividend is recoverable if the recipient-!that, when paid, the distribution was lawful and
reasonable, and that the insurer did not know and could
not reasonably 1 lave known that the distribution might
adversely affect its solvency.

M l M M <>ni

'iMII'l

'i I \

)7

V?\ I I I } I

"> .I'll ill ill is d i lllliul .1.

any person who controls, is controlled by, oi Is "under
common control with, another person. A corporation is
an affiliate of another corporation, regardless of
ownership, if substantially the same group of natural
persons manages the corporation.

and "under common control" as "the direct or indirect possession of thepower to
direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person" which
can be shown by common management.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A 1-301 (27)(a)(ii)

(emphasis added).
Bused
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therein, the Liquidator seeks recoupment of all distributions paid to LWP during
the five years prior to the filing of the liquidation petition because LWP was an
2

Section 31A-1-301 was amended in 2001
sections at issue in the present matter.

LPUO.
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affiliate of Insurance. Contrary to the Trial Court's ruling, the plain language of
the Statute dictates that once affiliate status is proven, Insurance is entitled to such
relief.
To support its contention that LWP was an affiliate, the Liquidator provided
evidence of common management including, inter-alia, that John Igoe, the owner
and former Chairman and COO of LWP, served in overlapping positions with
Group, LWP and Insurance. In addition to Mr. Igoe's overlapping positions, the
Liquidator also offered other evidence of common management such as LWP and
Insurance were managed by the same core group of people: John A. Igoe, Orrin T.
Colby, Jr., Dennis T. Larson and July Adlam.
In Mr. Igoe's and the other overlapping managers' positions, they were able
to negotiate deals between LWP and Insurance, made management decisions for
LWP and Insurance regarding claims handling services, had input into the scope
and nature of the services that would be performed by LWP for Insurance, and the
compensation to be paid for those services. Furthermore, Insurance and LWP had
a common employee base. The shared management team supervised employees'
day-to-day business activities and records keeping. In addition to the common and
overlapping management, there was common ownership. LWP and Insurance
were both wholly owned subsidiaries of Group.
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Statute. Rather than observe the plain language of the Affiliate Transaction
Statute, the Trial Court held that being an affiliate does not equate to control but
rather determined that the obligation to pay back distributions to affiliates required
• i I \\ o s(ei) a11a 1 \ s e
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" i J11 K \ 11 \\ III inc Liquidator was required to prove
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Insurance thereby resulting in the payments. In essence, it was necessary to prove
affiliate control and then control that the Trial Court held should be exercised in a
particular manner-namely directing that payments be made.
Ill lie I ni mi.II ( 'i nil I I lien went on to hold that even though there may he* e ^er»
KIS o f time in which 11 n ire v ere | ml n IU ner i n 1 opei ilor, lint iac-

sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to control. The Trial Court's ruling
disregarded the evidence of common and overlapping management, in addition to
the evidence on joint owners and managers. Regardless, at the very least the Trial
Court incorrectly ruled ;,

>ere were disputed material issues of fact

lluiil pt'eekilled 'iinniiin judgment i'< 1<> Ihe intent iH'ennlinl mi ill lilkile sl.ilus.
The Trial Court further misinterpreted the definitions of "distribution" and
"dividend" as set forth in the Statute. The Statute's plain language evidences two
separate categories are used to describe what is subject to recoupment: the general
category is "distribution" and then the subset is "dividend." Established Utah law
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mandates that each word is used advisedly and that the intent of each word is
revealed in the context and structure in which it is placed. Starting with that basic
premise, it must be assumed that the Utah Legislature chose the words
"distribution" and then "dividend" and in doing so, intended, from the context and
structure, that they have differing meanings, namely, distribution being the general
category with dividend being the subset, or category. This plain reading
interpretation is further consistent with the objectives and policy of the Statute-to
reach all distributions and not just those issued to shareholders.
The definition of "affiliate" and "control" found in the Statute promotes a
very specific policy objective in the regulation of insurance companies and their
relationship with affiliates, namely, to control the mutuality of interest that flows
between affiliates and insurance companies. As stated in the legislative history
pertaining to affiliate transactions, transactions between insurance companies and
their affiliates are extraordinarily vulnerable to abuses because of the mutuality of
interest, or as specifically stated in the legislative history, the concern with
"intergroup transactions."3 Without the fairness derived from the robust
negotiations between the independent needs of a service purchaser and the capacity
of a service provider, an affiliate transaction can easily become a negotiation with
3

Professor Spencer Kimball was the principal author and editor of the current edition of
the Utah Insurance Code. See infra Part II.B. Professor Kimball wrote the legislative
history of the Utah Insurance Code, a copy of which is attached hereto in the Addendum.
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one's self. When the interests of the seller and buyer converge as a result of
common ownership and/or overlapping management, a mutuality of control exists
between the affiliated entities whereby reciprocal benefits/burdens and control/be
controlled are exchanged. Control can flow back and forth between the affiliate
members as deemed appropriate by common management. As a result of the
commingled interests of affiliates and the insurance company, the Statute's
definition of affiliate includes not only the exercise of control by the affiliate but
also the potential for the affiliate being controlled. Because the affiliate and
insurance company are beholding to a common goal achieved by common
management, the definition of affiliate and control include both dominant (exercise
of control) and subservient (potential to be controlled) roles.
The Utah Department of Insurance (the "UDOI") is responsible for the
regulation of insurance companies such as Insurance and Mutual, but the UDOI's
oversight does not include non-insurance companies such as LWP. When the
affairs of the insurance company become so intertwined with a non-regulated
entity like LWP through affiliate transactions, the regulatory purview of the UDOI
must be expanded to include the affiliate transactions. Part of the UDOI's
legislative mandate is to protect the interests of policyholders, and if the financial
resources of the insurance company (which are the source of payment of the risk
transferred from the policyholders to the insurance company) are being expended
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for the benefit of an affiliate, then oversight of those transactions by the regulator
is mandatory. It is for that reason that every insurance company must report its
transactions with any affiliate in the Form B filed with the UDOI and to obtain
approval of the UDOI prior to entering into any such contracts- something
Insurance did not do. Without such disclosures it is difficult, if not impossible, for
the UDOI to track the interests of the insurance company vis a vis the affiliate
transaction. In this case, the amount of money passing between Insurance and
LWP is quite substantial (i.e., $6 million).
Because affiliate transactions are susceptible to overreaching on the part of
the insurance company or the affiliate (or both), the Utah Legislature was
concerned that undue control or influence might take place between the insurance
company and its affiliate, particularly if the insurance company has reached the
point of liquidation. It is precisely because of the potential for abuse of control in
the affiliate relationship that the Liquidator can merely prove the "indirect
possession of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and
policies" before it is entitled to recoupment. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-l301(27)(a).
This policy also promotes fairness because like other creditors, after
recoupment an affiliate can get in line to make a claim against the liquidation
estate. It would be unfair to allow an affiliate, one with mutuality/unity of interest
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with the insurance company, to obtain an advantageous contract with the insurance
company, retain the proceeds of that advantageous contract and then force other
third-party creditors to pursue liquidation claims. Recoupment of affiliate
transactions draws back into the liquidation estate all monies that can then be
divided among creditors with the same priority claims. Without recoupment, an
affiliate is given preferential treatment over other third party claimants.
Finally, to the extent the Trial Court found any ambiguity in the Statute, it
should have looked to the legislative history of the Statute, as opposed to other
definitions in the Utah Code for the context of the present definitions.
Based on the above misinterpretations and misapplication of the evidence,
the Trial Court incorrectly granted summary judgment in LWP's favor.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT, EVEN
THOUGH LWP WAS AN AFFILIATE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31A-27-322, LWP WAS NOT AN AFFILIATE IN CONTROL OF
INSURANCE BECAUSE MERE COMMON OWNERSHIP OR
OPERATION IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO
PRESUME CONTROL.
While the Trial Court correctly held that the evidence established that LWP

was an affiliate of Insurance, it incorrectly held that LWP was not an affiliate in
control of Insurance. Rather than observe the plain language of the Statute, which
states that any distribution to an affiliate made five years before the filing of the
liquidation petition must be repaid, the Trial Court misinterpreted the plain
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language of the Statute, instead finding that "mere common ownership or
operation,...

is [not] a sufficient basis to presume control." (R. 2437) (emphasis

added).
The controlling Statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-322 states in pertinent
part as follows:
If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or
conservation of an insurer authorized to do business in
this state is ordered under this chapter, the receiver
appointed under the order has a right to recover on behalf
of the insurer from any affiliate that controlled the insurer
the amount of distributions, other than stock dividends
paid by the insurer on its capital stock, made at any time
during the five years preceding the petition for
liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation. This recovery
is subject to the limitations of Subsections (2) through
(6).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-27-322. An affiliate is defined as "any person who

controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, another person. A
corporation is an affiliate of another corporation, regardless of ownership, if
substantially the same group of natural persons manages the corporation."
CODE ANN.

UTAH

§ 31A-1-301(5). The Statute goes on to define "control," "controlled,"

and "under common control" as "the direct or indirect possession of the power to
direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person" which
can be established by common management.
301(27)(a)(ii).
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UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-1-

By LWP's own admission, and as the Trial Court found, LWP was an
affiliate of Insurance. (R. 2973). Yet, the Trial Court went on to find that "[t]he
court is not persuaded, however, that mere common ownership or operation, at
least to the extent set forth in this record, is a sufficient basis to presume control."
(R. 2437). In issuing its ruling on the meaning of "affiliate" and "control," the
Trial Court claimed that it was interpreting the plain language of the Statute. (R.
2976).
The Trial Court's interpretation, however, is directly contrary to the plain
language of the Statute. The Trial Court essentially held that an affiliate has two
meanings, one where control is presumed and one where control must be
demonstrated in a manner other than as set forth in the Statute. (R. 2437). The
plain language of the Statute does not allow for such a split. Rather, the Statute
clearly defines an affiliate as an entity that is controlled by or under common
control with another—"affiliate" and "control" are thereby synonymous with one
another.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-1-301(5). Moreover, the Statute's plain

language does not mandate that control actually be exercised in the manner held
by the Trial Court, but rather, there be only either (1) direct power to cause the
direction of management or (2) "indirect possession of the power to direct or cause
the direction

" UTAH CODE ANN. 31A-l-301(27)(a).
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The Trial Court's finding that while there may have been common operation
or ownership and thereby affiliate status, but not control, is contrary to the plain
language of the Statute. The Liquidator offered evidence that showed LWP and
Insurance were affiliates and that they were managed by the same individuals, thus
the Liquidator showed that LWP and Insurance were controlled by the same group.
Where the Trial Court found the facts established that LWP was an affiliate of
Insurance, summary judgment should have been entered for Insurance.
A.

The Trial Court Ignored the Evidence of Common Control/
Management.

Regardless of the admission and finding of affiliate status, the Liquidator
presented irrefutable evidence that Insurance and LWP were affiliates of one
another because "substantially the same group of natural persons manag[ed] the
companies" and that the overlapping management actually exercised the control.
As the Statute makes clear, common or overlapping management is sufficient to
establish affiliate status/control.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-1-301(5). LWP is an

affiliate of Insurance because there was such common management.
Common management is reflected in the overlap of John Igoe's involvement
in Group, LWP and Insurance. See, e.g., Johnson-Tanner v. First Cash Financial
Serv., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39 ( D.D.C. 2003) ("Sharing officers between the
parent and the subsidiary or the presence of 'interlocking directorates' are
indicative of common corporate ownership and control."); In re Chicken Antitrust
24

Litigation, 560 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (N.D.Ga. 1982) (explaining, "'shared' officers
and directors raise a strong inference of domination by the parent and indicate []
'common direction and supervision . .. .'"). LWP itself admitted, at least from
November 6, 2001 to January of 2002, there was "interlocking control" based on
Mr. Igoe's overlapping positions. (R. 3393 at 26). While LWP and the Liquidator
disputed the duration and specific involvement of Mr. Igoe, there is no dispute that
John Igoe, the former owner of LWP Commercial, served concurrently as the
President and COO of Group and Insurance, and was also the CEO and Chairman
ofthe Board of Group and Insurance. (R. 2255, 2973). He was also Chairman of
the Board and CEO of LWP. (R. 1944,2255). In these leadership positions, it is
not disputed that Mr. Igoe was involved in transactions between LWP and
Insurance and had input, along with others, into the scope and nature ofthe
services that would be performed by LWP, and how much LWP would be paid for
those services. (R. 2287). Mr. Igoe also made crucial management decisions for
Group and Insurance regarding claims handling services. (R. 2286). While Mr.
Igoe's overlapping positions within Group, Insurance and LWP is not afforded any
presumption of control, UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-l-301(27)(b), his involvement
and actual exercise of power in the management, is indicative ofthe common
management.

25

Furthermore, Mr. Dennis Larson, who represented Insurance in their
principal financial dealings with LWP, was at the same time CFO of LWP. (R.
2298-9).
Additional undisputed evidence of interlocking corporate structure and
management is that from January 1, 2000 through at least May 8, 2002, Group,
LWP and Insurance had a common employee base, meaning they shared the same
employees and management team. (R. 2287, 2399). Group management, which
included John A. Igoe, Orrin T. Colby, Jr., Dennis T. Larson, and others, also made
management and employee decisions for Group, LWP and Insurance. (R. 2287).
Further, the management, officers, and directors of Group controlled Insurance and
LWP by virtue of their management and supervision of the employees day-to-day
business activities, and record keeping. (R. 2287).
Finally, the corporate relationship/ownership of the companies is further
evidence indicative of control. Group was the parent of Insurance and LWP until
2002. (R. 1944,2256). While this is not in and of itself determinative of common
management, combined with the above facts of common management of Group,
Insurance and LWP, it further demonstrates affiliate status.
The above evidence, submitted to the Trial Court in the Form B filings, Mr.
Colby's affidavit, LWP's own admissions in John Igoe's affidavit and LWP's
Motion for Summary Judgment, confirm that Mr. Igoe and others managed Group,
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Insurance, and LWP as one company, utilized the same employees, and entered
into agreements with each other on behalf of one another. (R. 2288). The Trial
Court, however, incorrectly disregarded this evidence of affiliate status, thus
control.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Extending its Ruling to Both Mutual
and Insurance Where There Were Disputed Material Issues of
Fact Regarding the Extent of LWP's Control of Insurance and
Mutual.

Summary judgment is not proper when there are genuine issues of material
fact. Hilly. Grand Central, Inc., 477 P.2d 150, 151 (Utah 1970). Summary
judgment is also not a vehicle to determine what the facts are, but only to ascertain
whether there are any material issues of fact in dispute. Id. The Trial Court
ignored this mandate and incorrectly applied its ruling to both Insurance and
Mutual even though there were disputed material facts as to the degree of LWP's
control of Insurance and Mutual.
1.

There Were Material Issues of Fact In Dispute Regarding Mr.
Igoe's and Others Level and Duration of
Control/Management of Insurance Such That Summary
Judgment Should Have Been Denied to L WP.

While the parties do not dispute the general fact that there was common and
overlapping management as set forth above, there were at least material issues of
fact on the level of common management such that summary judgment should
have been denied to LWP.
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In issuing its ruling, the Trial Court explained that common ownership or
operation did not prove control. (R. 2437). To support its ruling, the Trial Court
explained that even assuming there were some periods of time in which there were
joint owners or operations, that fact did not raise a question of fact on control. (R.
2437). Rather, to prove control the court wanted evidence that "LWP 'controlled'
Insurance or Mutual to the extent that it could direct them to make payments to
LWP in order to prevail herein." (R. 2977).
As explained above, control or affiliate status can be demonstrated, where
"substantially the same group of natural persons manages the corporation."
CODE ANN.

UTAH

§ 31 A-l-301(5) & 27(a)(ii). In issuing its ruling, the Trial Court

misapplied the affiliate test. The Statute says nothing as specific as the Trial Court
required—that the Liquidator prove that LWP could direct that payments be made.
(R. 2977). While this might be considered as one of the factors used to prove
control, it is certainly not the sole factor. The Trial Court's misapplication of the
facts could stem from its misunderstanding of the Statute's requirement of control.
Specifically, the Trial Court misapplied the facts because it failed to observe
the material issues of fact on control, and thereby affiliate status, of Insurance by
LWP. For example, LWP and the Liquidator disputed Mr. Igoe's and Dennis
Larson's, the CFO, level of involvement and control of LWP, Insurance and
Group. The Liquidator maintained that in Mr. Igoe's capacity as CEO, COO and
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President of Group and Insurance and CEO of LWP and Mr. Larson's position as
CFO, they were directly involved in drafting and/or administering a services
agreement whereby LWP provided claims services to Group and Insurance. (R.
2298). The Liquidator further maintained that Messrs. Igoe and Larson had direct
input into the scope and nature of the services that would be performed by LWP,
and how much LWP would be paid. (R. 2299). LWP, however, disputed this
evidence, instead arguing that Mr. Igoe was not the CEO of Group at the time the
administrative services agreement was entered into. (R. 2398). LWP also disputed
that Mr. Igoe had direct involvement in the negotiation of that agreement, instead
arguing it was drafted, reviewed and approved by other board members. (R. 2399).
LWP also disputed the duration of any overlapping management, arguing it
only went through January 1, 2002, the date it claims the purchase of LWP was
effective. (R. 2399). The Liquidator argues the overlapping management
extended to the closing date of May 8, 2002 and is supported by Mr. Igoe's
resignation to Group of his various Board and management positions being
effective May 8, 2002. (R. 2256). Further, no effective date is recited in the
agreement evidencing the purchase of LWP. (R. 2283).
Finally, most curious was the Trial Court's ruling on the duration of affiliate
status. The Trial Court held that LWP was an affiliate of Group and therefore an
affiliate of "Insurance from October 1998 until the sale of LWP to Igoe and Adlam
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in 2002." (R. 2973). This holding, however, while in the Liquidator's favor, is
based on contradictory evidence. The Liquidator argued that there was affiliate
status from November 16, 1999 through May 8, 2002 while LWP argued there was
affiliate status from November 16, 1998 through December 31, 2001. (R. 1944,
2256). Again, while such evidence was to the Liquidator's benefit, it does
demonstrate the factual disputes on which the Trial Court based its ruling.
These facts were dispositive to affiliate and thereby control because they
demonstrated the level and common/overlapping management. Because LWP and
the Liquidator had material factual disputes as to the duration and level of
involvement going to affiliate/control status, summary judgment should have been
denied to both LWP and the Liquidator.
2.

There Were Material Issues of Fact that Precluded Summary
Judgment on LWP's Control of Mutual.

Although the Liquidator was confident that it could prove that Mutual and
LWP were affiliates, the Liquidator acknowledged in its Reply Memorandum in
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, that there was contradictory
evidence (i.e., disputed material facts) as to control of Mutual. (R. 2285). The
basis for this concession was that LWP, in its Motion for Summary Judgment,
asserted that neither John Igoe nor LWP ever controlled Mutual. (R. 1940, 2037).
The Liquidator provided sworn affidavit testimony of Orrin T. Colby, Jr. refuting
that claim, to which LWP responded with a supplemental affidavit of John Igoe.
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(R. 2296-2302; 2396-2403). The competing affidavits of Orrin Colby and John
Igoe evidence the factual dispute regarding whether or not LWP, John Igoe, and
others controlled Mutual.
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that "[o]ne sworn statement under oath
is all that is needed to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy
and create an issue of fact, precluding the entry of summary judgment." Lucky
Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The sworn
statements of Mr. Colby and Mr. Igoe created an issue of fact that should have
precluded summary judgment as to Mutual. The fact that LWP brought its own
Motion for Summary Judgment as to both Mutual and Insurance is not dispositive.
No matter how compelling the evidence, where there are disputed issues of
material facts, summary judgment must be denied. Id.
The Court's Memorandum Decision analyzed control but incorrectly did so
with respect to Mutual. The holding of the Trial Court on Mutual's affiliate status,
like its ruling on Insurance, was based on contradictory evidence and thereby went
well beyond the mandate that summary judgment is not proper when there are
genuine issues of material fact.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE WORDS
"DISTRIBUTION" AND "DIVIDEND" ARE SYNONYMOUS AND
THEREBY INCORRECTLY HELD THAT THE STATUTE DOES
NOT ALLOW RECOVERY OF PAYMENTS FOR SERVICES
RENDERED.
Once affiliate status is proven., the Liquidator is statutorily empowered to

recover from any affiliate any distribution made at any time during the five years
preceding the petition for liquidation.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-27-322.

Specifically, the broad language of the Statute applies to all distributions, except
the subset of distributions, dividends, which are not recoverable where the
recipient shows that the dividend was fair and reasonable. UTAH CODE ANN. §
31 A-27-322(2). This section essentially subordinates the claims of affiliates, or
"insiders" to the claims of other creditors or policyholders against the remaining
assets of the liquidation estate. While at first blush it may seem inequitable or
even harsh, the policy reason behind this authority is sound-protection against the
abuses of affiliates. The Trial Court misinterpreted this Statute section, instead
finding that the words "distribution" and "dividend," are interchangeable and
synonymous with one another. (R. 2438, 2978, 2980). Based on that
misinterpretation, the Trial Court went on to find that because the payments to
LWP were for services rendered, they were not dividends or other transfers of
equity and thereby not recoverable. (R. 2438, 2980).
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It is axiomatic that in interpreting a statute, the plain language of the act
determines its meaning. Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 2002
UT 32, f 18, 48 P.3d 888, 894 (Utah 2000). The plain language of the Statute
reveals that "distribution" and "dividend" are not synonymous with one another.
Rather, the Utah legislature used two words in describing what is and what is not
recoverable: "distribution"-the more inclusive, general category and then
"dividend"-the subset of distribution. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-322(l)-(2).
The exact language of the Statute states in pertinent part:
(1) If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or
conservation of an insurer authorized to do business in
this state is ordered under this chapter, the receiver
appointed under the order has a right to recover on behalf
of the insurer from any affiliate that controlled the insurer
the amount of distributions, other than stock dividends
paid by the insurer on its capital stock, made at any time
during the five years preceding the petition for
liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation. This recovery
is subject to the limitations of Subsections (2) through
(6).
(2) No dividend is recoverable if the recipient shows
that, when paid, the distribution was lawful and
reasonable, and that the insurer did not know and could
not reasonably have known that the distribution might
adversely affect its solvency.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-27-322(l)-(2).

Though not a complete model of clarity, a simple reading reveals two
separate categories are used to describe two types of recoupments; the general
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category "distribution," being completely recoverable once affiliate status is
shown, regardless of whether it was lawful and reasonable and the subset
"dividend," is only exempt from recovery where they are proven to be lawful and
reasonable. These words must be interpreted "on the assumption that each term is
used advisedly and that the intent of the Legislature is revealed in the use of the
term in the context and structure in which it is placed." Ward v. Richfield City, 716
P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984). Therefore, it must be assumed that the Legislature
intended to use the word "dividend" when it used it as a special sub-class of
"distributions" which the recipient shareholder could demonstrate as fair and
reasonable and therefore not returnable to the liquidation estate. That privilege
was not granted to distributions in general, only the specific subset of dividends.
This interpretation is consistent with the types of recoupments that are
recoverable. Distribution, as the general category, includes monetary and nonmonetary payments. (R. 3393 at 19). For example, a distribution includes
dividends, along with other assets, furniture and computer software, etc. (R. 3393
at 20). LWP itself concedes that "distributions isn't strictly limited to dividend."
(R. 3393 at 30). The disconnect in LWP's concession is that it goes on to argue,
and the Trial Court accepted, that while a distribution encompasses more than just
money, it is limited to "giving out the equity of a company in respect to shares."
(R. 2391).
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While there are no reported cases construing section 31A-27-322 of the Utah
Code, the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake City, State of Utah (Judge
Tyrone E. Medley) has encountered virtually identical arguments asserted by
LWP. (R. 2280). In the lawsuit captioned American Western Life Insurance
Company in Liquidation v. LelandA. Wolf (Case No. 980905251) (the "American
Western Lawsuit"), the defendants responded to the liquidator's Motion for
Summary Judgment that only excessive dividends could be recovered by the
liquidator, not the sales proceeds paid by an insurance company to an affiliate for
the purchase of used furniture and computer equipment from the affiliate (a less
than arm's-length transaction that resulted in a multi-million dollar windfall to the
affiliate). (R. 2280). In the Order dated May 22, 2003, Judge Medley ruled in
Paragraphs 19 and 20 as follows:
19. The statute [§ 31A-27-322] provides that the
liquidator may recover "the amount of distributions"
which is the broad general rule. The next phrase (i.e.,
"stock dividends are not recoverable") creates an
exception to that general rule or a subset of the general
class.
20. The word "dividend" as used in this statute creates
a special class of distributions which the recipient
shareholder could demonstrate as fair and reasonable and
therefore not returnable to the liquidation estate. This
limitation on recovery only applies to the subset of
dividends; it does not apply to the broad general category
of "distributions."
(R. 2280).
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Based on the plain language of the Statute, the Trial Court should have
entered summary judgment in the Liquidator's favor, ruling that the words
"distribution" and "dividend" are not synonymous; rather, distribution is the
general category with dividend being a subset. Further based on the plain
language, the Trial Court should have ruled that the only "distribution" subject to
the lawful and reasonable test was "dividend." The Trial Court should therefore
have found that once affiliate status was proven, the Liquidator was entitled to all
distributions, except those dividends that were proven to be lawful and reasonable.
A.

The Trial Court's Ruling That Distributions and Dividends are
Synonymous Offends the Objective and Policy of the Statute.

Respecting the plain meaning of the Statute and observing that "distribution"
and "dividend" are not synonymous also serves the objective of the Statute.
Dividends, a payment of capital to shareholders at the time of payment, is a type of
distribution. There are many other types of distributions, including the payment by
one affiliate to another for services rendered (R. 2281, 3393 at 11). Affiliates are
not necessarily shareholders. (R. 2281). The application of the Statute is meant to
reach beyond just shareholders and recipients of dividends. (R. 2281). Recipients
of dividends are therefore given an opportunity to prove that the dividend was fair
and reasonable. (R. 2281). The reason for this is clear. There may be individual
shareholders who are not control persons and who have innocently received
dividends. (R. 2282). In that case, non-control persons are permitted to prove that
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the dividend was fair and reasonable - the Statute provides a clear test to determine
if the dividend was appropriate. (R. 2282). But if the distribution is not a
dividend, the Statute's plain language dictates that the distribution must be
returned to the Liquidator. (R. 2282). The strong presumption of the Statute (i.e.,
that the recipient's distribution was a result of overreaching and undue control)
dictates that the distribution be returned without regard to the reasonableness of the
transaction.
There is also a strong equitable policy that supports the Liquidator's
position. The objective of the Affiliate Transaction Statute is to draw back into the
liquidation estate monies that will be used to pay policyholders and third party
creditors rather than affiliates (which are insiders akin to controlling shareholders).
(R. 2283). This policy is sensible given that distributions are not subject to
reporting. (R. 3393 at 16). Before a dividend is issued it has to be pre-approved
by the insurance department. (R. 3393 at 16). To avoid the reporting of dividends,
the simple solution is to issue a distribution. (R. 3393 at 16). To be able to reach
the unreported distributions, the Statute mandates that all distributions must be
returned, except the subset of dividends where it can be shown that it was fair and
reasonable.
As part of the basis for its ruling, LWP's counsel argued and the Trial Court
found that the above position advanced by the Liquidator,
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would result in the anomalous situation where pure
dividends of any size could not be recovered if lawful
and made without reason to know that the dividend might
adversely affect the company's solvency, but small
payments for services fairly rendered in the ordinary
course of business would be fully recoverable.
(R. 2979). Though not interpreted as a benefit nor relevant to the present situation,
there could be the situation that the distribution was smaller than the dividend,
however, if the dividend is not shown to be fair and reasonable, then it too would
be subject to return.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31 A-27-322(2). Regardless of the

hypothetical situations that may arise, the plain language of the Statute must guide
its interpretation, irrespective of any preconceived inequities. Furthermore, this
concern is not relevant. The plain language of the Statute does not mandate that
the above concern of LWP's be taken into consideration. Rather, once affiliate
status is proven, all distributions, regardless of the size must be returned.
LWP, along with the Trial Court, was incorrectly persuaded by a perceived
inequity of the Statute as opposed to adhering to the Statute's plain language.
LWP argued that the plain language interpretation provided by the Liquidator
allowed it to "get something for nothing." (R. 3393 at 28). The Trial Court itself
admitted it was having difficulty with the concept that "distribution" might include
monies paid for services rendered-that it needed more specific language that
included recoupment for reasonable or unreasonable services. (R. 3393 at 19).
While the inherent unfairness asserted by LWP is not a concept that is addressed in
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the plain language of the Statute, affiliates are not without a remedy or recourse.
The affiliates can file a claim against the liquidation estate and share in the
proportionate proceeds which may be paid to similarly situated creditors. (R.
2281).
B.

The Trial Court Disregarded the Legislative History of the
Statute that Indicates that the Statute is Applicable To All
Transactions, Not Just Dividends.

In its Memorandum Decision, the Trial Court held that the plain language of
the Statute would guide its interpretation, even while conceding the Statute was not
a model of clarity. (R. 2438). Then in the Order Granting LWP's Motion for
Summary Judgment, rather then only relying on the plain language of the Statute,
as so held in the Memorandum Decision, the Trial Court looked to other
definitions of "dividend" and "distribution" as a context for its interpretation of
"distribution" and "dividend" in the present Statute. (R. 2978-80). While there is
no definition of "distribution" and "dividend" in the section at issue, 31A-27-322,
LWP and the court should have been guided by the plain language of the Statute,
or find the language ambiguous and then look to the legislative history. In re
Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, f 23, 1 P.3d 1074, 1079 (Utah 2001) ("When doubt or
uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's provision, an
analysis of the act in its entirety should be undertaken and its provision harmonized
in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose.") Accordingly, rather than
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solely look to other definitions of "distribution" and "dividend" within the Utah
Code, the Trial Court should have deferred to the legislative history.
While LWP asserted that the legislative history of section 31A-27-322
supported its bald assertion that the terms "distribution" and "dividend" are
synonymous, review of the history evidences the contrary. (R. 2277-78).
The author of the current Utah Insurance Code, Professor Spencer L.
Kimball, commissioned by the Utah State Legislature to draft Utah's version of the
Model Insurance Code, produced a document entitled "State of Utah Draft
Insurance Code" ("Draft") dated March 1983. (R. 2277). The original Title 31 A,
Insurance Code, was based on Professor Kimball's Draft Insurance Code. (R.
2278).
Professor Kimball, in the Prefatory Comment of the Draft Insurance Code,
states as follows:
There is no room for argument, however, that after
formation of a holding company system there must be
serious concern with intergroup transactions. They are
subject to abuse involving vast sums of money, the
improper transfer of which can endanger policyholder
and public interest. This chapter carries concern for such
transactions a step farther than does the Model Act or
previous law. See section 96-17-6.5.
(R. 2278). As evidenced in the Prefatory Comment, from the very beginning,
Professor Kimball was concerned about transactions by and between an insurance
company and its affiliates. (R. 2278).
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Virtually all of chapter 96-17 of Professor Kimball's Draft Insurance Code
was enacted as Chapter 16 of the current Utah Insurance Code entitled "Insurance
Holding Companies." (R. 2278). Section 96-17-6.5 of the Draft Insurance Code
entitled "Liability of Affiliates," are dispositive in ascertaining the intent of the
legislature:
There are other potential abuses, beside excessive
dividends, in the holding company development. They
include all of the devices for "milking" that have been
ingeniously exploited in other contexts. They encompass
the full range of less than arm's-length transactions that
benefit affiliates at the expense of the insurer. They
permit evasions of insurance laws and regulations by a
parent holding company through payment to insurance
agents and employees, for example, that could not be
done by an insurance company alone.
(R. 2279). This succinct statement evidences that the Statute was intended to
address all potential abuses with affiliates, not just dividends.
In construing a statute, the court is to give effect to the legislature's intent in
light of the purpose the Statute was meant to achieve. In re Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28,
123, 1 P.3d at 1079. Section 31A-27-322 was enacted to address not only
excessive dividends, but also other excessive distributions between an insurance
company and its affiliates.
Contrary to LWP's assertion, the legislative history unequivocally supports
the Liquidator's position, not LWP's position.
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CONCLUSION

The Trial Court, misinterpreting section 31A-27-322 of the Utah Code,
incorrectly granted summary judgment to LWP. The Liquidator on behalf of
Wasatch Crest respectfully asks the Utah Supreme Court to reverse the Trial
Court's granting of summary judgment in LWP's favor and find as follows: (1)
consistent with the evidence presented to the Trial Court, the Liquidator on behalf
of Wasatch Crest asks that this Court find that LWP was an affiliate of Insurance
and thereby in control of Insurance; (2) as an affiliate of Insurance, Insurance is
entitled to recoupment of any distribution which includes monies paid for services
rendered; (3) the only distributions Insurance is not entitled to recoup are dividends
that are shown to be fair and reasonable; or (4) that there were material issues of
fact that precluded summary judgment as to Mutual and Insurance.
DATED this 16th day of June, 2006.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

John P. Harringt
Cecilia M. Romero
Attorneys for the Liquidator
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